Achieving scalable access control over encrypted data for edge computing networks by Cui, H. et al.
Received May 13, 2018, accepted May 29, 2018, date of publication June 6, 2018, date of current version June 20, 2018.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2844373
Achieving Scalable Access Control Over Encrypted
Data for Edge Computing Networks
HUI CUI 1,2, XUN YI 1, AND SURYA NEPAL2
1School of Science, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC 3000, Australia
2Data61, CSIRO, Melbourne, VIC 3008, Australia
Corresponding author: Hui Cui (hui.cui@rmit.edu.au)
This work was supported by the Data61 Research Collaborative Project ‘‘Enhancing Security and Privacy in IoT.’’
ABSTRACT The concept of Internet of Things (IoT) has raised in the cloud computing paradigm as it
adds latency when migrating all pieces of data from the network edge to the data center for them to be
approached. Edge computing has been introduced to extend the cloud computing architecture to the edge
of the network, which analyzes most of the IoT data near the devices that produce and act on that data.
Though edge computing solves the latency problem of data processing, it also brings issues to the data
security and privacy preservation. One technique which is potential to provide scalable access control to
support data security and privacy in edge computing is attribute-based encryption (ABE). In this paper,
we propose a primitive named proxy-aided ciphertext-policy ABE (PA-CPABE), which outsources the
majority of the decryption computations to edge devices. Compared to the existing ABE with outsourced
decryption schemes, PA-CPABE has an advantage in which the key distribution does not require any secure
channels. We present a generic construction of PA-CPABE and then formally prove its security. In addition,
we implement an instantiation of the proposed PA-CPABE framework to evaluate its performance.
INDEX TERMS Data security and privacy, access control, cloud computing, IoT security, edge computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of Internet of Things (IoT) has become increasingly
popular, which enables various objects including physical
devices, vehicles, buildings and other items embedded with
computing and communication capabilities to exchange data.
However, because of limitations in the computation capabil-
ity, battery, storage and bandwidth, smart devices sometimes
may decrease the quality of services and weaken the user
experience. Cloud computing supplies resources to end users
in terms of software, infrastructure and platform, and delivers
services to applications at a comparatively small cost, which
has been considered as a promising solution to mitigate the
limitation of devices with constrained resources.
Unfortunately, cloud computing cannot be an answer to
all emerging problems, since some IoT applications need to
be instantly responded, some contain sensitive information,
and some generate a large amount of data and cause a heavy
workload to the network. The demand for distributing the IoT
workloads between the local data center and the cloud has
resulted in an architectural model called Edge Computing [1]
(which is also known as Fog Computing [2]).
Edge computing extends cloud computing and facilitates
cloud computing in significantly reducing the delays incurred
FIGURE 1. An architecture for Edge Computing.
by service deployments. End devices, edge and cloud form a
three-layer hierarchical architecture (as shown in Fig. 1) for
the service delivery, which supports a wide range of appli-
cations (e.g., the smart city network). Take the autonomous
vehicle network as an instance, where the vehicle might
produce gigabyte data in one second, and the real-time pro-
cessing is in necessity as any delay in practice could lead
the vehicle to make false resolutions [1]. In such a situation,
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the responding time could be extremely long if all data items
are going to be forwarded to and processed by the cloud, and
thus it would be very demanding for the current network to
support a large number of vehicles in the same area. There-
fore, it is essential for all kinds of data items to be managed at
the network edge to reach a more effective management and
a shorter response time.
Edge devices reduce communication and computation
overheads by providing computing, networking and storage
services and making decisions at the network edge. Unfor-
tunately, edge devices requiring less cost than cloud servers
can be easily compromised by adversaries and cannot be
trusted, especially in the data sharing (e.g., vehicles may
need to share the traffic data when traveling on the same
motorway) situation. Therefore, it is indispensable to arm an
edge computing network with an access control mechanism
to allow the data to be shared among data users possessing
certain attributes while preventing other entities (including
the cloud server, edge devices and unprivileged data users)
from learning the original data.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [3] protects data secu-
rity and privacy by sharing data among a group of privileged
data users, which is believe to be a very desirable candi-
date for accomplishing scalable (i.e., fine-grained) access
control over data items in encrypted forms. One feature of
current ABE schemes is that they are built upon bilinear
pairings (or bilinear maps), and thus it is significantly chal-
lenging to deploy such schemes in applications where the
private data will be accessed via a mobile device with a
constrained computation capacity. With this issue in mind,
Green et al. [4] suggested to divide the private attribute-key
in an ABE scheme into a transformation key and a decryption
key, of which the former is sent to a proxy such that the proxy
can make a transformation on the ciphertext (to produce a
partially decrypted ciphertext) and the latter is given to the
data user such that the data user can completely decrypt the
transformed ciphertext. Following this direction of delegat-
ing the workloads in the decryption to a third party like a
proxy, in terms of enhancing data security and privacy to
meet different requirements in the real world, several ABE
schemes enabling outsourced decryption (e.g., [5], [6]) have
been proposed.
ABE with outsourced decryption (ABE-OD) has an inher-
ent property to be implemented in an edge computing net-
work to enforce access control and protect data security
and privacy, where the edge device can play the role of
the proxy. However, all existing ABE-OD schemes require
secure channels to distribute private keys to data users, which
is not feasible for all applications in the edge computing
network due to the expensive cost in building secure chan-
nels. Motivated by this observation, we consider design-
ing a secure channel free ABE-OD scheme (to distinguish
from ABE-OD, we call it proxy-aided ciphertext-policy ABE
(PA-CPABE)) to provide scalable access control over data
items in encrypted forms in the edge computing network. Our
aim is to give a generic transformation technique which is
able to convert any ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryp-
tion (CP-ABE) [7] scheme into a PA-CPABE scheme. Briefly
speaking, the contributions in this paper are threefold.
• We put forth a primitive called proxy-aided ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption (PA-CPABE) to out-
source the decryption workloads of ABE ciphertexts to
an untrusted proxy (i.e., an edge device) but without
requiring any secure channels for the key distribution,
which can be seamlessly integrated into the edge com-
puting network to accomplish the scalable access con-
trol.
• We give a generic construction for PA-CPABE via
which a PA-CPABE scheme could be converted from a
CP-ABE scheme, and then apply a concrete CP-ABE
scheme which satisfies certain properties into the
generic construction of PA-CPABE to obtain a concrete
PA-CPABE scheme.
• We implement the proposed concrete PA-CPABE
scheme as well as its underlying CP-ABE scheme to
assess the practicability of the former and show that
PA-CPABE significantly ameliorates the decryption cost
incurred for the data user in an ordinary CP-ABE
scheme.
A. RELATED WORK
To facilitate the deployment of cloud computing and inter-
net of things (IoT) services, edge computing [1] allows
to conduct computation on the data at the network edge.
Despite the advantages of edge computing, many challenges
have raised as well, including data abstraction, programma-
bility, data security and privacy, service management and
optimization metrics, el al. [1]. In this paper, the focus
is the preservation of data security and privacy for edge
computing.
Thanks to the property of enabling access control over
data items that are encrypted, a primitive to preserve data
security and privacy for scenarios like cloud computing called
attribute-based encryption (ABE) [3] has been intensively
adopted in cloud relevant applications since its introduction
in 2005. However, ABE has several drawbacks which impede
its usability in the real world, especially its expensiveness
in the computation which makes it impractical for resourced
constrained devices to run ABE related algorithms. Existing
ABE schemes (e.g., [7], [8]) are built from bilinear pair-
ings, and thus their decryption algorithms require expensive
pairing operations (one pairing operation usually takes three
times more than one exponentiation operation). To address
this problem, Green et al. [4] recommended to outsource the
decryption workload in ABE to a proxy (or a server) where
the private attribute-key is divided into a transformation
key for the proxy and a decryption key for the data user
such that only one exponentiation operation is needed to be
conducted by the data user to decrypt the result received
from the proxy to obtain the original message. The proxy
is not a trusted entity, so it may not do the calculation in a
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correct way. To address this issue in ABE with outsourced
decryption (ABE-OD), Lai et al. [5] proposed an a con-
struction on ABE with verifiable and outsourced decryp-
tion (ABE-VOD), but that scheme adds significant amount
of calculations to the original ABE scheme and thus is not
efficient. Li et al. [6] suggested to check whether the result
of the outsourced decryption in an ABE-VOD scheme is
correct in a distributed manner to improve the efficiency, but
more than one key generation center (KGC) are assigned
in the ABE-VOD scheme and at least one of them should
be honest and take the correct ciphertext as the input.
Qin et al. [9] and Mao et al. [10] presented generic construc-
tions on ABE-VOD, respectively, which can transform any
ABE-OD scheme to an ABE-VOD scheme. Fan et al. [11]
presented a revocable ABE-VOD scheme in the setting of
multiple KGCs where the role of the single key generation
center (KGC) is split across multiple KGCs.
B. ROADMAP
The rest of this paper is going to be structured in the
following way. In Section II, the notations and notions rel-
evant to this paper are revisited. In Section III, the system
framework and the security definition for a proxy-aided
ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (PA-CPABE)
scheme are described. In Section IV, a generic construc-
tion on PA-CPABE, and an instantiation of PA-CPABE
are presented. In Section V, in addition to the com-
parison result between PA-CPABE and other related
works, the implementation result of the proposed instan-
tiation is detailed. Finally, this paper is concluded in
Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly delineate several notations and
terminologies that are going to be utilized in this paper.
A. ACCESS STRUCTURES AND SECRET
SHARING SCHEMES
Informally speaking, authorized sets consist of parties in
groups that are given access, and an access structure is the set
of all such authorized sets, which describes that who should
be work with whom in order to have access to a resource
(i.e., secret). A scheme where the secret is shared by different
parties and only those subgroups of parties included in the
access structure are capable of recomputing the secret by
putting their shares together is called a (linear) secret sharing
scheme. If a subset, say S, belongs to an access structure, and
all sets containing the subset S are covered by this access
structure as well, then this access structure is said to be
monotone.
Below the formal notions for an access structure, as well
as a secret sharing scheme, are described.
Definition 1 (Access Structures [8], [12], [13]): Take a
collection of parties P= {P1, ..., Pn} into consideration. A set
A⊆ 2P is said to be monotone if for all B and C , C ∈ A holds
when B ∈ A and B ⊆ C . In essence, an access structure is
composed of a class A of non-empty subsets of the parties P,
i.e., A⊆ 2P \ {∅}. Any set in the access structure A is defined
to be an authorized set, and any set not in the access structure
A is defined to be an unauthorized set.
Definition 2 (Linear Secret Sharing Schemes [8], [12],
[14]): Consider P as a class of entities. DenoteM as a matrix
having n columns and l rows, and ρ : {1, ..., l} → P as a
function mapping a row to an entity for the labeling purpose
(note that the pair (M, ρ) will also be referred to as the access
structure A in this paper). A secret sharing scheme 5 over a
set of entities P satisfying the following properties is said to
be a linear secret sharing (LSS) scheme over Zp.
1) A vector over Zp can be formed from the shares of each
party.
2) There exists a share-generating matrix M with l rows
and n columns in association with the secret sharing
scheme 5. Suppose that for any i ∈ [1, l], an entity
ρ(i) is expressed to label the i-th row of the matrixM.
Assume that−→v = (µ, r2, ..., rn) is a column vector with
µ ∈ Zp being the secret which is going to be shared and
r2, ..., rn ∈ Zp being randomly chosen elements. Then
M−→v is the vector of l shares of the secret µ in terms
of the secret sharing scheme 5. Thus, an entity ρ(i)
actually possesses a share (M−→v )i.
It has been stated in [12] that each LSS scheme is equipped
with a property known as linear reconstruction. Let 5 be an
LSS scheme for an access structure A with an authorized set
A. Define I ⊆ {1, ..., l} as I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ A}. Then the span
of rows of the matrix M which is indexed by I includes a
vector (1, 0, ..., 0), and it is not difficult to find constants
{wi ∈ Zp}i∈I (regarding the size of the share-generating
matrixM) satisfying
∑
i∈I wivi = µ for any valid shares {vi}
of a secret µ in terms of the LSS scheme5 in the polynomial
time [15].
B. CIPHERTEXT-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
Denote CAE = (CAE.Setup, CAE.KeyGen, CAE.Encrypt,
CAE.Decrypt) as a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryp-
tion (CP-ABE) (e.g., [16]), where CAE.Setup is a setup
algorithm which creates the public parameter pmA as well
as the master private key mkA on input the security param-
eter λ, CAE.KeyGen is a private attribute-key generation
algorithm which creates a private attribute-key skA for an
attribute set A on input the public parameter pmA, the mas-
ter private key mkA and a set of attributes A, CAE.Encrypt
is an encryption algorithm which creates a ciphertext CT
associated with an access structure structure A on input the
public parameter pmA, an access structure A and a message
M , and CAE.Decrypt is a decryption algorithm which creates
a message M if the attributes A of a private attribute-key
skA is an authorized set of the access structure A ascribed
to a ciphertext CT or a failure symbol ⊥ otherwise on input
the public parameter pmA, a ciphertext CT associated with
an access structure A and a private attribute-key skA over
attributes A [17].
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When a CP-ABE scheme CAE is considered to be correct,
it means that for any security parameter λ ∈ N, any message
M (in the message space), any authorized attribute set A
(in the space of attributes) for any access structure A
(in the space of access structures), if (pmA, mkA) ←
CAE.Setup(1λ), skA ← CAE.KeyGen(pmA, mkA, A), CT←
CAE.Encrypt(pmA, A, M ), it holds that CAE.Decrypt(pmA,
CT, skA) = M .
Let m0 and m1 be two messages of the same length,
and OKG(·) be the private attribute-key generation oracle
which outputs a private attribute-key skA associated with
a set of attributes A by taking the public parameter pmA,
the master private key mkA and a set of attributes A as the
input with the restriction that any set of attributes A sat-
isfying the challenge access structure A∗ is disallowed to
be queried to the OKG(·) oracle. Regarding any probabilis-
tic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, if the advantage
function
AdvIND-CPACAE,A (λ)
=Pr
b′=b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(pmA,mkA)← CAE.Setup(1λ), b← {0, 1}
(m0,m1,A∗, state)← AOKG(·) (pmA)
CT∗← CAE.Encrypt(pmA,A∗,mb)
b′← AOKG(·) (pmA,m0,m1,A∗, state,CT∗)

−1/2
is negligible in the security parameter λ, then a CP-ABE
scheme CAE is regarded to be indistinguishable under cho-
sen plaintext attacks (shortly, IND-CPA secure). In addition,
if there exists an Init phase before the CAE.Setup phasewhich
gives the challenge access structure A∗ the adversaryA aims
to attack, then a CP-ABE scheme CAE is regarded to be
selectively IND-CPA secure.
C. PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION
Let PE = (PE.Setup, PE.KeyGen, PE.Encrypt, PE.Decrypt)
denote a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme (e.g., [18])
where PE.Setup is a setup algorithm which generates the
public parameter pmP by taking a security parameter λ as
the input, PE.KeyGen is a key generation algorithm which
generates a public and private key pair (pkid , skid ) for the
data user id by taking the public parameter pmP and a data
user id as the input, PE.Encrypt is an encryption algorithm
which generates a ciphertext CT by taking the public param-
eter pmP, a public key pkid and a message M as the input,
and PE.Decrypt is a decryption algorithm which generates
a message M or a failure symbol ⊥ by taking the public
parameter pmP, a ciphertext and a private key skid of a data
user id as the input [19].
When a PKE scheme PE is considered to be correct,
it means that for any security parameter λ ∈ A, any message
M (in the message space), if pmP ← PE.Setup(1λ), (pkid ,
skid )← PE.KeyGen(pmP, id), CT← PE.Encrypt(pmP, pkid ,
M ), it holds that PE.Decrypt(pmP, CT, skid ) = M .
FIGURE 2. A pictorial system architecture of PA-CPABE.
Letm0 andm1 be twomessages of the same size. Regarding
any PPT adversary A, if the advantage function
AdvIND-CPAPE,A (λ)
= Pr
b′=b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
pmP← PE.Setup(1λ), b← {0, 1}
(pkid , skid )← PE.KeyGen(pmP, id)
(m0,m1, state)← A(pmP, pkid )
CT∗← PE.Encrypt(pmP, pkid ,mb)
b′← A(pmP, pkid ,m0,m1, state,CT∗)

−1/2
is negligible in the security parameter λ, a PKE scheme PE is
regarded to be IND-CPA secure (i.e., indistinguishable under
chosen plaintext attacks).
III. FRAMEWORK AND SECURITY DEFINITION
We define the framework, as well as the security model,
for proxy-aided ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
(PA-CPABE), in this section.
A. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The architecture of a PA-CPABE scheme is depicted under
the scenario of an edge computing network in Fig. 2, involv-
ing four entities: data users, the trusted key generation center
(KGC), untrusted proxies (i.e., edge nodes or edge devices)
and data owners. The KGC is in charge of the creation of
the common parameter and the master private key. The KGC
keeps the latter in secret and make the former public. Once
a data user Bob intends to join the network, he registers with
the KGC. Firstly, Bob creates a public user-key and a private
user-key. Then, Bob transmits the public user-key to the KGC
(along with a proof about his knowledge of the corresponding
private user-key) and keeps the private user-key as a secret.
The KGC, on the basis of Bob’s eligible attributes and pub-
lic user-key, produces a public transformation key for Bob,
which is going to be broadcast to all local edge nodes of Bob.
Before uploading a message (e.g., a document or a file) to the
cloud, a data owner Alice uses the common public parameter
to encrypt the message over an access structure she specifies.
The resulting ciphertext for the message (rather than the
plaintext of the message) is sent to the nearby edge device
which will forward the ciphertext to the cloud if necessary.
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In case that Bob needs to access a ciphertext, Bob transmits to
the cloud a request, and the cloud will forward the ciphertext
to the nearby edge device which is capable of performing the
computation. If the attribute set possessed by Bob satisfies
(i.e., is an authorized set of attribute for) the access structure
associated with the ciphertext, the edge device is capable of
using the transformation key of Bob to partially decrypt (i.e.,
transform) the ciphertext. After obtaining the transformed
ciphertext from the edge device, Bob uses his private user-
key to fully decrypt it to obtain the underlying plaintext.
Notice that all data users in PA-CPABE only need to
communicate with the KGCwhen they firstly register with an
edge computing network. In addition, the operations handled
by the untrusted edge devices (i.e., the proxies) are com-
pletely transparent to data users. In other words, a data user,
if necessary, can check whether the partial decryption has
been correctly conducted via transforming the ciphertext by
himself/herself.
B. FRAMEWORK
The algorithms for a proxy-aided ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption (PA-CPABE) scheme PCAE are as follows,
of which some are similar to those in [13].
• Setup(1λ)→ (pm, mk). This algorithm is run by the key
generation center (KGC). It takes the security parameter
λ as the input, and outputs the public parameter pm and
the master private key mk .
• UserKG(pm, id)→ (pkid , skid ). This algorithm is run by
each data user id . It takes the public parameter pm and
a data user id as the input, and outputs a public user-key
pkid and a private user-key skid for the data user id .
• PubKG(pm, mk , pkid , A)→ pkAid . This algorithm is run
by the KGC. It takes the public parameter pm, the master
private key mk , a public user-key pkid and a set of
attributes A of a data user id as the input, and outputs
a public transformation key pkAid for the data user id .
• Encrypt(pm, A, M )→ CT. This algorithm is run by the
data owner. It takes the public parameter pm, an access
structure A and a messageM (in the space of messages)
as the input, and outputs a ciphertext CT.
• Transform(pm, CT, pkAid )→ CT′. This algorithm is run
by the proxy (or an edge device). It takes the public
parameter pm, a ciphertext CT for an access structure
A and a public transformation key pkAid for an attribute
set A of a data user id as the input, and outputs the
transformed (or partially decrypted) ciphertext CT′ if
the attribute set A is a set of authorized attributes for
the access structure A.
• Decrypt(pm, CT′, skid )→ M/⊥. This algorithm is run
by the data user id . It takes the public parameter pm,
a partially decrypted (or transformed) ciphertext CT′ and
a private user-key skid of a data user id as the input, and
outputs a message M or a failure symbol ⊥.
We say that a PA-CPABE scheme PCAE is correct, mean-
ing that for any security parameter λ ∈ N, any message M
(in themessage space), any data user id’s set of attributesA (in
the space of attributes) satisfies any access structureA (in the
space of access structures), if (pm, mk)← Setup(1λ), (pkid ,
skid )← UserKG(pm, id), pkAid ← PubKG(pm, mk , pkid , A),
CT← Encrypt(pm, A,M ), CT′← Transform(pm, CT, pkAid ),
we have Decrypt(pm, CT′, skid ) = M .
C. ADVERSARIAL MODEL
Considering the adversarial model for PA-CPABE, the proxy
(i.e., an edge node or an edge device) is assumed to be
untrusted such that the proxy may be in collusion with data
users but the proxy itself does not hold any secret such that
anybody is able to execute all operations conducted by the
proxy (which implies that any misbehavior of the proxy can
be conveniently observed), and the key generation center
(KGC) is assumed to be trusted (implying that the master
private key is always secretly kept and should not be leaked
anyway). Thus, the adversary is given access to private user-
keys, as well as data users’ public transformation keys and
attribute sets of its choice (except those data users with
attributes satisfying the challenge access structure), but the
adversary can never acquire any information related to the
original plaintext hidden in a ciphertext in association with
the challenge access structure.
Below the indistinguishability under chosen plaintext
attacks (shortly speaking, the IND-CPA security) is defined
between a challenger algorithmB and an adversary algorithm
A for a PA-CPABE scheme PCAE.
• Setup Phase. For the generation of the public parameter
pm and the master private key mk , algorithm B runs
the Setup(1λ) algorithm. Algorithm B keeps the master
private key mk in secret, and sends to algorithm A the
public parameter pm. In addition, algorithm A creates a
list L which is initially empty to store (id , (pkid , skid ))
for data users.
• Phase 1. The following queries are adaptively issued to
algorithm B by algorithm A.
– Private-User-Key oracle. For any private user-key
query on a data user id issued by algorithm A,
in order to return a private user-key skid , algorithm
B runs the UserKG(pm, id) algorithm. Notice that
algorithmB adds (id , pkid , skid ) to a list L whenever
it runs the UserKG(pm, id) algorithm so that the
same key pair (pkid , skid ) will be used for all queries
on the same data user id .
– Transformation-Key oracle. For any public
transformation-key query on a data user id and a
set of attributes A issued by algorithmA, in order to
return a transformation key pkAid , algorithm B runs
the UserKG(pm, id) algorithm (if no private user-
key query on a data user id has been issued to the
Private-User-Key oracle) and the PubKG(pm, mk ,
pkid , A) algorithm.
• Challenge Phase. Algorithm A outputs two messages
m∗0, m∗1 (m∗0 and m∗1 are of the same size), an access
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structure A∗ with the constraint that a query on (id∗,
A∗) satisfying the challenge access structure A∗ should
never be issued to the Transformation-Key oracle once a
private user-key query on a data user id∗ has been issued
to the Private-User-Key oracle. In order to respond to
algorithm A, algorithm B randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1},
and runs the Encrypt(pm, A∗, m∗b) algorithm to generate
the challenge ciphertext CT∗.
• Phase 2. Following that restriction declared in the Chal-
lenge stage, algorithm A continues querying to the
Private-User-Key and Transformation-Key oracles as in
Phase 1.
• Guess Phase. Algorithm A outputs a guess b′ for b.
Algorithm A wins when b′ = b.
The advantage of algorithm A in the IND-CPA security
game for a PA-CPABE scheme PCAE is defined to be Pr[b =
b′]−1/2. The PA-CPABE scheme PCAE is considered to be
IND-CPA secure if a PPT adversary has at most a negligible
advantage in the security parameter λ. Note that when there is
an Init phase before the Setup stage, during which algorithm
A outputs the challenge access structure A∗ that it targets
to attack, the PA-CPABE scheme PCAE is considered to be
selectively IND-CPA secure.
IV. CONSTRUCTIONS ON PROXY-AIDED
CIPHERTEXT-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
A generic construction and an instantiation for proxy-aided
ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (PA-CPABE),
as well as their security analysis, are illustrated in detail in
this section.
A. INTUITION
The key challenge of building a PA-CPABE scheme is a
generic key splitting technique which is able to divide the
private attribute-key in a CP-ABE scheme into two parts,
of which one is set as the public transformation key and
sent to the proxies (i.e., edge nodes or edge devices) and
the other one which is kept and generated by the data user
himself/herself is defined as the private user-key. It is worth-
while to notice that neither a public transformation key nor
the private user-key can be individually input to decrypt a
ciphertext, which implies that the public transformation key
and the private user-key have to work together to obtain
the plaintext of a ciphertext. With the goal of binding the
private user-key generated by each data user himself/herself1
to the public transformation key of this data user generated
by the KGC,2 we make use of the key regeneration (also
know as delegate) property which is inherent with a standard
CP-ABE scheme. Interestingly, we found that such a delegate
property can be subtly utilized to embed the public user-key
1This removes the need of secure channels between the key generation
center (KGC) and all data users for the secure delivery of the private user-
key.
2Note that the KGC will authenticate the identity or public user-key of
a data user and his/her eligible attributes before issuing the corresponding
public transformation key.
(which has a corresponding private user-key and is created
by a data user himself/herself) into the public transformation
key (which is used by the proxy to convert a ciphertext into
a partially decrypted ciphertext) and leave the corresponding
private user-key (which works as a trapdoor) for the data user
to fully decrypt a (partially decrypted) ciphertext.
B. GENERIC CONSTRUCTION
In general, a standard ciphertext-policy attribute-based
encryption (CP-ABE) scheme is born with a property known
as Delegate [7]. Specifically, assume that pmA is the pub-
lic parameter and mkA is the master private key created by
the setup algorithm CAE.Setup of a CP-ABE scheme CAE.
Given a private attribute-key skA over an attribute set A
which is generated by running CAE.KeyGen(pmA, mkA, A;
r) where r is the chosen randomness, it is easy to regen-
erate a delegated key sk ′A′ over an attribute set A
′ ⊆ A by
running Delegate(pmA, skA, A′; r ′) with r ′ being the chosen
randomness, which is equivalent to a private attribute-key
skA′ over an attribute set A′ generated by the KGC running
CAE.KeyGen(pmA, mkA, A′; r ◦ r ′) where ◦ is an operation
such as ‘‘×’’ and ‘‘+’’. In other words, the key created by
Delegate(pmA, skA, A′; r ′) is indistinguishable to the one
generated by CAE.KeyGen(pmA,mkA, A′; r ◦r ′). We observe
that this property can be extended one step further which we
call Extended Delegate (ExDelegate) satisfying the following
definitions.
• The key generated by the ExDelegate(pmA, skA, A′;
r ′) algorithm is equivalent to the one created by the
CAE.KeyGen(pmA, mkA ◦ r ′, A′; r) algorithm.
• The following two distributions upon a set of attributes
A{
(pk ′, r ′)← PE.KeyGen(pmP, id);
sk ′A←CAE.KeyGen(pmA,mkA◦r ′,A); : (pk
′, sk ′A)
}
,
and{
(pk ′, r ′)← PE.KeyGen(pmP, id);
s˜k ′A←CAE.KeyGen(pmA,mkA◦r∗,A); : (pk
′, s˜k ′A)
}
are computationally indistinguishablewhere PE.KeyGen
is the key generation algorithm of a public-key encryp-
tion (PKE) scheme PE which is deterministic such that
the public key pk ′ is deterministically computed from
the private key r ′ (this can be guaranteed by the IND-
CPA security of a PKE scheme).
Take the CP-ABE scheme in [7] as an example, where
the private attribute-key is skA = (f α+r , {gr · H (j)rj , grj}j∈A)
with α being the master private key, group elements g, f
and the hash function H belonging to the public parame-
ter. Below we show that it satisfies the Extended Delegate
property. Given CAE.KeyGen(pmA, α, A; (r, {rj}j∈A)) = skA
= (f α+r , {gr · H (j)rj , grj}j∈A), it is easy to compute a key
as ExDelegate(pmA, skA, A′; r ′) = sk ′A′ = ((f α+r )r
′
, {(gr ·
H (j)rj )r
′
, (grj )r
′}j∈A′ ) = (f α·r ′+r ·r ′ , {gr ·r ′ ·H (j)rj·r ′ , grj·r ′}j∈A′ )
= CAE.KeyGen(pmA, α · r ′, A′; (r · r ′, {r ′ · rj}j∈A′ )) =
CAE.KeyGen(pmA, α ·r ′, A′; (r, {rj}j∈A′ )) (setting r = r ·r ′, rj
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= rj ·r ′). In addition, for a public user-key pk ′ = gr ′ and a pri-
vate user-key sk ′= r ′ generated by the PE.KeyGen algorithm,
it is not difficult to see that (gr
′
, (f α·r ′+r , {gr ·H (j)rj , grj}i∈A′ ))
and (gr
′
, (f α·r∗+r , {gr · H (j)rj , grj}i∈A′ )) are computationally
indistinguishable.
Denote PE = (PE.Setup, PE.KeyGen, PE.Encrypt,
PE.Decrypt) as an IND-CPA secure PKE schemewith a deter-
ministic PE.KeyGen algorithm, and CAE = (CAE.Setup,
CAE.KeyGen, CAE.Encrypt, CAE.Decrypt) as an IND-
CPA secure CP-ABE scheme with the ExDelegate property.
A generic construction of PA-CPABE, which is composed of
six algorithms, is given as follows.
• Setup(1λ). On input the security parameter λ, this
algorithm runs (pmA, mkA) ← CAE.Setup(1λ), and
pmP ← PE.Setup(1λ). It outputs mk = mkA as the
master private key and pm = (pmP, pmA) as the public
parameter.
• UserKG(pm, id). On input the public parameter pm
and a data user id , this algorithm runs (pkid , skid ) ←
PE.KeyGen(pm, id), and outputs pkid as a public user-
key and skid as a private user-key for the data user id .
• PubKG(pm, mk , pkid , A). On input the public parameter
pm, the master private keymk , a user id who has a public
user-key pkid and a set of attributesA, this algorithm runs
pkAid ← CAE.KeyGen(pmA, mkA ◦ pkid , A), where ◦ is a
group operation. It outputs a transformation key pkAid for
the data user id .
• Encrypt(pm, A, M ). On input the public parameter pm,
an access structure A and a message M (in the message
space), this algorithm runs CT←CAE.Encrypt(pmA,A,
M ). It outputs a ciphertext CT.
• Transform(pm, CT, pkAid ). On input the public parameter
pm, a ciphertext CT and a public transformation key pkAid
for a data user id with attributes A, this algorithm runs
CT′← CAE.Decrypt(pmA, CT, pkAid ). It outputs CT′ the
transformed ciphertext.
• Decrypt(pm, CT′, skid ). On input the public parame-
ter pm, a transformed ciphertext CT′ and a data user
id’s private user-key skid , this algorithm runs M ←
PE.Decrypt(pmP, CT′, skid ). It outputs the plaintext M
for a successful decryption and ⊥ otherwise.
For the correctness of a PA-CPABE scheme, we require
the underlying CP-ABE scheme CAE to be transformable
to a PKE scheme PE such that a ciphertext generated by
the encryption algorithm in a CP-ABE scheme CAE should
be able to be transformed to a ciphertext for the same mes-
sage created by the encryption algorithm in a PKE scheme
PE. At a high level, for any data user id with an autho-
rized attribute set A for an access structure A and a pub-
lic user-key pkid and a private user-key skid generated by
the key generation algorithm in a PKE scheme PE, it fol-
lows that CAE.Decrypt(pmA, CAE.Encrypt(pmA, A, M ),
CAE.KeyGen(pmA, mkA ◦pkid , A))= PE.Encrypt(pmP, pkid ,
M ) = CT′ such that PE.Decrypt(pmP, CT′, skid ) = M .
Theorem 1: The proposed generic construction on
PA-CPABE is (selectively) IND-CPA secure under the
assumption that the CP-ABE schemeCAEwhich satisfies the
Extended Delegate property is (selectively) IND-CPA secure,
and the PKE scheme PE is IND-CPA secure.
Proof: If there is an adversary algorithmAwhich is able
to break the IND-CPA security of the PA-CPABE scheme,
then we are able to construct an adversary algorithm A0
which is able to break the IND-CPA security of the CP-
ABE scheme CAE or the PKE scheme PE. Let B0 denote
the challenger algorithm for the CP-ABE scheme CAE and
B1 denote the challenger algorithm for the PKE scheme PE.
Note that for the selective IND-CPA security, an Init phase
during which a challenge access structure A∗ is outputted by
algorithm A is going to be defined before the Setup stage,
which algorithm A0 sets as its own output in the Init stage
for the selective IND-CPA security game of the underlying
CP-ABE scheme CAE.
• Setup Phase. AlgorithmA0 is given pmA from algorithm
B0 of the CP-ABE scheme CAE, and pmP, pk∗ from
algorithm B1 of the PKE scheme PE. Algorithm A0
sends pm= (pmP, pmA) to algorithmA, and keeps a list
L storing (id , (pkid , skid )) for data users which is initially
empty.
• Phase 1. The following queries to algorithm A0 are
adaptively issued by algorithm A.
– Private-User-Key oracle on a data user id . When
receiving a private user-key query on a data user id
from algorithm A, algorithm A0 returns a private
user-key skid by running the UserKG algorithm.
Algorithm A0 adds (id , (pkid , skid )) to the list L
such that the same (pkid , skid ) is going to be used
for all queries on the same data user id .
– Transformation-Key oracle on a set of attributes A
and a data user id . For a transformation-key query
on a data user id with a set of attributes A issued
by algorithm A. If no private user-key query on
this data user id has been issued, algorithm A0
generates a pair of public and private user-keys
(pkid , skid ) for this data user id , and writes them
to the list L. Algorithm A0 issues to algorithm B0
a private attribute-key generation query on the set
of attributes A to obtain a private attribute-key skA
for the attribute set A, and runs ExDelegate(parA,
skA, A; skid ) to create and return a transformation
key pkAid to algorithm A. Note that at some point,
algorithm A0 implicitly sets the public key for a
data user id∗ to be pk∗, and adds (id∗, (pk∗, ⊥))
to the list L. Algorithm A0 randomly chooses a
transformation key pkAid∗ , and returns it to algorithm
A. Because of the Extended Delegate property of
the CP-ABE scheme CAE and the security of the
PKE scheme PE, algorithm A cannot distinguish
whether the transformation key pkAid∗ is randomly
chosen or not.
• Challenge Phase. Algorithm A outputs an access struc-
ture A∗ and two messages m∗0, m∗1 (m∗0 and m∗1 are of
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the equal length). Algorithm A0 sends all of them to
algorithm B0 to generate the challenge ciphertext CT∗,
and returns to algorithm A the ciphertext CT∗ received
from algorithm B0.
• Phase 2. Algorithm A continues issuing queries to the
Private-User-Key and Transformation-Key oracles as in
Phase 1, following the constraint that a query on a
data user id with an attribute set A meeting the chal-
lenge access structure A∗ should not be issued to the
Transformation-Key oracle if a private user-key query
on this data user id has been issued.
• Guess Phase. AlgorithmAmakes a guess b′ for b. Algo-
rithm A0 transmits b′ to algorithm B0 as the output to
the IND-CPA security game for the underlying CP-ABE
scheme CAE.
Denote the event that algorithm A0 sets pk∗ as the public
user-key for a data user id∗ as E. It is not hard to have the
conclusion that in the view of algorithmA, the real game and
the simulation are the same except that the event E happens.
Denote qtk by the number of transformation key queries
issued by algorithm A. It is not difficult to conclude that the
event E happens for the data user id∗ with the probability
1/qtk . In this case, the transformation key pkA
∗
id∗ query on the
data user id∗ and a set of attributes A∗ meeting the challenge
access structure A∗ should never be issued to algorithm A0.
Therefore, the simulation is correct.
In summary, if algorithm A, with a non-negligible prob-
ability , is able to win the IND-CPA security game of the
PA-CPABE scheme, then algorithm A0, with a probability
/qtk , is able to win the IND-CPA security game of the
underlying CP-ABE scheme CAE.
C. INSTANTIATION
Let eˆ : G×G→ G1 be a bilinear map for G being a group of
a prime order p and g ∈ G being the corresponding generator.
Denote the attribute space as Zp, and themessage space asG1.
Below is the proposed concrete PA-CPABE scheme PCAE
built on the Rouselakis-Waters CP-ABE scheme in [16] and
the ElGamal PKE scheme in [18]. Note that some of the
algorithms are similar to those in [13].
• Setup. The input of this algorithm is a security parameter
λ. It randomly chooses a group element G with a prime
order p and a generator g ∈ G, and sets a bilinear map
eˆ : G × G → G1. Additionally, it randomly chooses u,
h, w, v ∈ G and α ∈ Zp. Let F1(x) = uxh be a function
mapping an element x ∈ Zp to an element inG. It outputs
pm = (p, G, G1, eˆ, g, w, v, u, h, eˆ(g, g)α) as the public
parameter and mk = α as the master private key.
• UserKG. The input of algorithm includes the public
parameter pm and a data user id . It randomly chooses
βid ∈ Zp, and outputs skid = βid as the private user-key
for the data user id . Also, it computes pkid = gβid , and
outputs pkid as the public user-key for the data user id .
• PubKG. The input of this algorithm includes the public
parameter pm, the master private keymk , a data user id’s
public user-key pkid and a data user id’s set of attributes
A = {A1, ..., Ak}. It randomly chooses r , r1, ..., rk ∈ Zp,
and computes
pk1 = pkidα · wr , pk2 = gr ,
pk (i)3 = gri , pk (i)4 = F1(Ai)ri · v−r .
It outputs a transformation key pkAid = {pk1, pk2, pk (i)3 ,
pk (i)4 }i∈[1,k] for the data user id eligible for a set of
attributes A.
Extended Delegate. Let skA = (sk1, sk2, {sk (i)3 ,
sk (i)4 }i∈[1,k]) = (gα · wr , gr , {gri , F(Ai)ri · v−r }i∈[1,k]) be
the private attribute-key for the Rouselakis-Waters CP-
ABE scheme [16]. Thus, we have ExDelegate(parA, skA,
A′; r ′) = sk ′A′ = ((gα · wr )r
′
, (gr )r
′
, {(gri )r ′ , (F(Ai)ri ·
v−r )r ′}i∈[1,k ′]) = (gα·r ′ · wr ·r ′ , gr ·r ′ , {gri·r ′ , F(Ai)ri·r ′ ·
v−r ·r ′}i∈[1,k ′])=ABE.KeyGen(parA, α ·r ′, A′; (r ·r ′, {r ′ ·
ri}i∈[1,k ′])). Since the key sk ′A′ can bewritten as (gα·r
′ ·wr ,
gr , {gri , F(Ai)ri · v−r }i∈[1,k ′]) by setting r = r · r ′ and
ri = ri · r ′, we have that (gr ′ , (gα·r ′ · wr , gr , {gri ,
F(Ai)ri ·v−r }i∈[1,k ′])) and (gr ′ , (gα·r∗ ·wr , gr , {gri ,F(Ai)ri ·
v−r }i∈[1,k ′])) are computationally indistinguishable.
• Encrypt. The input of this algorithm consists of the
public parameter pm, an access structure (M, ρ) (assume
thatM is an l×nmatrix) and a messageM . It randomly
chooses a vector −→v = (µ, y2, ..., yn)⊥ ∈ Znp , of which
the values are about to be used to share the secret µ.
It computes vi =Mi ·−→v (i ∈ [1, l]) (denoteMi as the i-th
row of the matrix M). In addition, it randomly chooses
µ1, ..., µl ∈ Zp, and computes
C0 = eˆ(g, g)αµ ·M , C1 = gµ, C (i)2 = wvi · vµi ,
C (i)3 = F1(Ai)−µi , C (i)4 = gµi .
It outputs CT = ((M, ρ), C0, C1, {C (i)2 , C (i)3 , C (i)4 }i∈[1,l])
as the ciphertext.
• Transform. The input of this algorithm contains the
public parameter pm, a ciphertext CT associated with an
access structure (M, ρ) and a transformation key pkAid
over attributesA of a data user id . Assume that the access
structure (M, ρ) is satisfied by the attribute set A, and I is
a set as {i : ρ(i) ∈ A}. Denote {wi ∈ Zp}i∈I as a class of
constants which satisfies
∑
i∈I wivi = µ when {vi} are
valid shares of the secret µ in terms of the matrix M.
It parses CT, and calculates
C ′0 =
∏
i∈I
(
eˆ(C (i)2 ,pk2)eˆ(C
(i)
3 ,pk
(i)
3 )eˆ(C
(i)
4 ,pk
(i)
4 )
)wi
eˆ(C1,pk1)
= 1eˆ(g,pkid α)µ .
It outputs CT′ = (C ′0, C0) as the transformed ciphertext.
• Decrypt. The input of this algorithm is composed of the
public parameter pm, a transformed ciphertext CT′ and
a data user id’s private user-key skid . It computes M =
(C ′0)1/βid · C0, and outputs the message M .
Theorem 2: The given concrete PA-CPABE scheme
PCAE is selectively IND-CPA secure under the assumption
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TABLE 1. Comparison between PA-CPABE and existing solutions on reducing computation overheads in decryption of CP-ABE.
that the Rouselakis-Waters CP-ABE scheme is selectively
IND-CPA secure and satisfies the Extended Delegate prop-
erty, and the ElGamal PKE scheme is IND-CPA secure.
Proof: It has been proved in [16] that the Rouselakis-
Waters CP-ABE scheme is selectively IND-CPA secure, and
the ElGamal PKE scheme is known to be IND-CPA secure.
In addition, the Rouselakis-Waters CP-ABE scheme satis-
fies the Extended Delegate property. Therefore, the given
concrete PA-CPABE scheme PCAE is selectively IND-CPA
secure on the basis of Theorem 1.
D. DISCUSSIONS
Our proposed generic construction for PA-CPABE can be
improved as follows.
• Verifiable and Outsourced Decryption. The proxy (i.e.,
an edge device) cannot be trusted in a PA-CPABE
scheme and may falsely execute the calculation, so it
is crucial to check whether the transformation has been
correctly conducted. Though the transformation key
stored by the proxy is public, and any entity can verify
the correctness of the transformation, it is still useful
to have ABE with verifiable and outsourced decryption
(ABE-VOD) schemes such that the data user is empow-
ered with the capability to efficiently verify whether the
transformation he/she has received from the proxy is cor-
rect or not as in some cases incorrect calculation might
cause disastrous outcomes. The generic construction on
ABE-VOD in either [9] or [10], built fromABE schemes
supporting outsourced decryption, can be applied to the
proposed generic PA-CPABE construction to achieve
efficient verification of the transformation executed by
the proxy when the data user attempts to get the plaintext
by running the decryption algorithm on the transformed
ciphertext.
• Attribute and User Revocation. An edge computing net-
work always involves a great number of data users whose
statuses might not be immutable and could regularly
change, because some data users may leave the edge
computing network after a certain time period, yet the
attributes of data users may differ over time. It is bene-
ficial for a PA-CPABE scheme to be equipped with an
efficient revocation mechanism such that data users as
well as the attributes possessed by data users in the edge
computing network can be selectively revoked by the
trusted authority (e.g., the KGC in PA-CPABE). There
exist generic techniques to achieve the revocation of
data users’ attributes and data users in ABE schemes
(e.g., [20], [21]) under the setting of an untrusted (or
semi-trusted) third party (e.g., [13], [21]), which can
be applied to the proposed PA-CPABE construction to
efficiently revoke attributes of data users and data users
in an edge computing network.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
After doing a comparison between several existing attribute-
based encryption with outsourced decryption (ABE-OD)
schemes and the proposed notion of proxy-aided ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption (PA-CPABE), we imple-
ment the given instantiation for PA-CPABE to evaluate its
performance in this section.
A. COMPARISON
Recall that there have been plenty of constructions
(e.g., [4]–[6], [9]–[11]) that target to mitigate the data user’s
computation workload in the decryption phase of attribute-
based encryption (ABE) schemes by outsourcing the decryp-
tion cost to a proxy such that only one exponentiation
operation needs to be performed by a privileged data user to
decrypt a ciphertext. The first ABE with outsourced decryp-
tion (ABE-OD) scheme was put forward by Green et al. [4],
where the proxy partially decrypts (i.e., transforms) the
ciphertext and transmits to the data user the transformed
ciphertext for decryption. The notion of ABE with verifiable
and outsourced decryption (ABE-VOD) was brought in by
Lai et al. [5] and Li et al. [6], respectively, providing effi-
cient verification on the accurateness of the transformation
executed by the proxy. Qin et al. [9] and Mao et al. [10] pre-
sented generic approaches of transformingABE-OD schemes
to ABE-VOD schemes, respectively. Fan et al. [11] added
the revocation function to a concrete ABE-VOD scheme
and applied the resulting scheme to a fog-cloud (i.e., edge)
computing network.
Table 1 compares the proposed PA-CPABE scheme and
several existing works related to outsourcing the workloads
resulted from decrypting ABE ciphertexts to a third party,
where ‘‘E’’ denotes exponentiation. It is straightforward to
see that there are no secure channels required in the pro-
posed PA-CPABE construction for the delivery of private (or
decryption) keys from the KGC to each data user in the edge
computing network, while all other existing constructions
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FIGURE 3. Average computation time of the data user in decrypting a
ciphertext. (a) SS512. (a) MNT159.
need secure channels to distribute private keys to data users
to achieve security. In addition, the existing solutions on ABE
with outsourced decryption are concrete schemes, while the
proposed construction on PA-CPABE is generic which can
convert any CP-ABE scheme satisfying certain properties to
a PA-CPABE scheme.
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The given instantiation of PA-CPABE and its underlying
CP-ABE scheme in [16] are implemented in a framework
called Charm [22]. In addition to the Charm framework,
the Python package and the PBC library are installed for cer-
tain cryptographic operations. All experiments are executed
on an all-in-one desktop with the 8GB RAM and the Intel
Core i5-6500 CPU @ 3.2GHz running the 64-bit Ubuntu
16.04 over a VMware Workstation Player which is set with
the 1GB RAM [17].
To provide an eighty-bit security level, the simulation is
conducted under two elliptic curves knowns as SS512 and
MNT159.3 In the underlying CP-ABE scheme of the given
concrete
PA-CPABE scheme and the given concrete PA-CPABE
scheme, the average computation time spent by a data user
on the decryption of ciphertexts ascribed to access structures
3Note that MNT159 is known as an asymmetric Type 3 pairing, while
SS512 is known as a symmetric Type 1 pairing.
consisting of ten to fifty attributes is summarized as in Fig. 3
(note that the average computational cost of the proxy in
decrypting a ciphertext in the given concrete PA-CPABE
scheme is similar to that of the data user in decrypting a
ciphertext in the underlying CP-ABE scheme [16]). Concern-
ing the underlying CP-ABE scheme [16], the average com-
putation time spent by a data user on running the decryption
on ciphertexts over access structures containing ten to fifty
attributes and private attribute-keys with ten to fifty attributes
ranges from 0.07s to 0.34s with respect to the SS512 curve
and 0.15s to 0.71s with respect to the MNT159 curve,
respectively. For the given concrete PA-CPABE scheme,
the average computation time spent by a data user (using a
private user-key) with ten to fifty attributes on the decryption
of ciphertexts associated with access structures including ten
to fifty attributes is about 0.2ms regarding the SS512 curve
and 1.0ms regarding the MNT159 curve, respectively. It is
clear to find from Fig. 3 that PA-CPABE has the capability
of significantly reducing the computational overheads of
data users in decrypting ciphertexts, where the computational
cost of a data user in doing the decryption on ciphertexts is
independent to the size of attributes related to the ciphertexts
and the attribute-keys.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Internet of Things (IoT) devices constantly generate
data, and require the data analysis to be rapid, which cannot
be provided by the traditional cloud computing architecture.
With the target of analyzing the IoT data close to the devices
that generate and operate on the data, edge computing has
been introduced for the extension to the edge of the network
from cloud computing. Though edge computing facilitates
cloud computing in addressing the latency problem of data
processing, it also brings more security and privacy issues to
the existing cloud computing network. Due to the fact that
attribute-based encryption (ABE) supports fine-grained (or
scalable) access control for data items in encrypted forms,
ABE has been widely believed to be an ideal solution to
protect data security and privacy for scenarios of cloud com-
puting. To achieve fine-grained access control for the edge
computing environment, in this paper, we proposed a notion
named proxy-aided ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryp-
tion (PA-CPABE). After describing a generic construction of
PA-CPABE, we formally analyzed its security. In addition,
we presented and implemented an instantiation of PA-CPABE
to evaluate its efficiency.
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